Turkey's Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan certainly added a new element to the ongoing Israel's war on Gaza, by appearing on Aljazeera TV and saying that his country will be conveying Hamas's conditions for a ceasefire to the international community through its new post as a rotating member of the UN Security Council, which started on January 1.

As if that was not enough to send shockwaves throughout Israel, Egypt and the US, Erdogan harshly criticised the Zionist State, accusing it of provoking Hamas into a confrontation in Gaza, which caused, he added, "a humanitarian tragedy".

This is not new for Erdogan. The Turkish prime minister made his foreign policy clear in 2004 when he refused an invitation to visit Israel from then prime minister, Ariel Sharon. Instead, Erdogan received a delegation from Hamas, headed by Khalid Mesha'al, in Turkey. He next turned down a meeting with then Labour and Trade Minister Ehud Olmert in July 2004.

In December 2004, Erdogan landed in Damascus, building bridges with the Syrians after relations soured with France, the US and the UN after passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1559.

Six months later, he kept silent when the US started pressuring Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, in marked contrast to most US allies, after the assassination of Lebanon's former prime minister, Rafik Hariri.

Turkey and Iran were among the few countries that kept shoulder-to-shoulder with Damascus during 2005, when the US was toying with "regime change" in Damascus. In the midst of all the noise being made against Tehran, Erdogan also coordinated strikes with Iran on the Kurdish Worker's Party (PKK) in northern Iraq, much to the displeasure of the US.

Turkey under Erdogan was clearly projecting itself as a mediator and a big sister to countries in the Arab and Muslim world, longing for a position that it once enjoyed as leader of the Islamic nation.

If anything, Erdogan's loud stance on Gaza solidifies him as a champion and a problem-solver, more than ever before, in the eyes of millions around the Arab world. If he succeeds in bringing a halt to hostilities, under Hamas's conditions, he would be forever hailed for having succeeded.

If not, he would be remembered for having tried, while most Arab countries are either incapable - or unwilling - to take the chance.

This was a new Turkey - Erdogan seemed to be saying; a different Turkey, that has new foreign policy priorities. When I interviewed the Turkish leader for the Damascus-based Forward Magazine in 2007, at the height of his crisis with the PKK, Erdogan best described it as a "multi-dimensional" policy which can be described as constructive engagement".

He sounded proud and confident of his country's alliance with Syria and Iran - which also meant, Hamas, Hezbollah and Qatar - and certain that his Turkey was on the right track.

Position

Taken aback by Erdogan's position was the so-called "Moderate Axis" in the region, headed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in the West Bank. The "other axis" was seemingly growing by the day: Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria, Iran, Qatar, and now, Turkey.

Erdogan's readiness to convey Hamas's condition to the UN puts a damper on the proposal of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who conditioned opening the Rafah crossing on a ceasefire and that Rafat is operated by Europeans the PNA, as the case in 2005-2007.

That proposal was turned down by the Hamas-government in Gaza, because it would empower Mahmoud Abbas and further isolate and weaken Hamas.

If Erdogan gets his way, Hamas would get de facto recognition by all players, as an equal partner to Israel, and as a legitimate government in Gaza, undermining Abu Mazen and his authority in the West Bank.

The European Union said that European monitors could not return to man the crossing because their legal jurisdiction no longer held ground, now that the crossing was operated by Hamas, rather than Fatah.

The 2005 agreement specifies control for the PNA's Force 17, Egypt, Israel and the Europeans. If an agreement is reached, the Europeans would have to talk to Hamas, and so would the Egyptians, thereby offering the Islamic party de facto recognition.

The so-called Moderate Axis is uneasy, believing that if this happens, Gaza would become an Iranian satellite on the borders of Egypt.

Turkish sources claim that Erdogan is not taking sides, but is willing to hear out all sides - Egypt, Hamas, Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia - to reach a consensus that would further strengthen Turkey's role as an honest broker and political heavyweight in the Middle East.

Turkey's two-stage plan envisages a ceasefire in step one, and a rapprochement between rival Palestinian groups, mainly Fatah and Hamas, in step two. Turkey was willing to play the mediator, said the Turkish prime minister, who added, "Hamas officials have full confidence in Turkey".

Turkey believes that an Arab and UN observatory force should be deployed on the border between Gaza and Israel, and it would take responsibility for border crossings and delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza.

Erdogan's strategy, however, depends on how long Hamas can survive on the battlefield. If it manages to repeat what Hezbollah achieved in 2006, it can score a political victory, even if it gets defeated militarily in battle.

If Erdogan gets all sides to sit with Hamas, either directly through round table talks, or indirectly through Turkey, and open the Rafah Crossing, that would be a victory for both the Palestinians, and Erdogan's Turkey.

The report is Special to Gulf News by Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine in Syria.
First published:January 06, 2009