'We can no longer borrow dollars. U.S. money-market funds are not lending to us anymore," a bank executive for BNP Paribas, who declines to be named, told me last week. "Since we don't have access to dollars anymore, we're creating a market in euros. This is a first. . . . We hope it will work, otherwise the downward spiral will be hell. We will no longer be trusted at all and no one will lend to us anymore."

He's not the only one worried. France's three biggest banks have been the subject of whisper campaigns about their solvency since the beginning of the summer, and Société Générale has lost 22.5% of its value.

BNP, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole together hold nearly $57 billion in Greek sovereign and private debt, versus $34 billion held by the largest German banks and $14 billion at British banks. French banks also held more than €140 billion in total Spanish debt and almost €400 billion in Italian debt as of December, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. If either of these latter two governments were to default, their banking systems could collapse and take the French system with them.

BNP, Société Générale and Credit Agricole all say that their finances are in order and the market worries are unfounded. But it's difficult for the BNP executive to hide his concern.

"Look at the French banks' debt holdings versus those of U.S. banks," he continues. "The total debt of the three big U.S. banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan and Citigroup) is $5.86 trillion, or 39% of GDP, while the debts of BNP, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale come to €4.7 trillion, or 250% of French GDP."

Analysts are suggesting that the government is set to start nationalizing France's banks. The banks have remained silent on the matter, and the government denies this talk. But the last time the French state intervened in the banking system in a big way, the results were disastrous. As recently as the 1980s, most French banks were owned by the state, and by the 1990s the sector was bordering on bankruptcy. The French banking sector shrank by nearly 50% during the decade, while the those in other countries such as Britain and the U.S. grew by 39% and 50%, respectively.

The most famous case of that time was Crédit Lyonnais, which was plagued by mismanagement throughout the 1980s and 1990s until it shifted its debts and liabilities into a new state-owned company, the Consortium de Réalisation. In 2003 Crédit Lyonnais was taken over by Crédit Agricole, but in July 2008 its bills came due anyway.

An arbitration court ordered the Consortium de Réalisation to pay €240 million to the liquidators of the Bernard Tapie group, along with €105 million in interest and €45 million in moral damages—a total of €395 million for one erstwhile borrower. Meanwhile, the SdBO (Western Bank Corporation), a subsidiary of Crédit Lyonnais, lent sums to the Tapie family that added up to more than two-and-a-half times the bank's total capital. French taxpayers paid out more than €15 billion for the mismanagement of Crédit Lyonnais over the years.

The taxpayer-backed losses of mortgage lender Crédit Foncier came to €2 billion. And the Hervet bank (now part of the HSBC group) announced the first losses in its history after its 1982 nationalization.

These and other disasters were brought on by the bank nationalizations of the early 1980s. But despite the subsequent privatizations, French bank boards are still dominated by the alumni of France's famous ENA, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, and by officials who have worked at the Ministry of Finance. A study by the Management Institute at the Université de La Rochelle finds that between 1995 and 2004 banks administered by government-linked technocrats were in greater total debt than those that were not.

Whether the market's worst fears are realized or not, French banks certainly maintain an all-too-close relationship to the state. This opaque system doesn't offer outsiders much visibility, save for the knowledge that indebted banks and an indebted French state intend to continue to cover each other, no matter the cost and on taxpayers' backs if they must. If U.S. money-market managers no longer trust the French system, this is a glaring reason why. The fastest way to regain their trust would be to end this system.

Mr. Lecaussin is director of development at France's Institute for Economic and Fiscal Research.

He's not the only one worried. France's three biggest banks have been the subject of whisper campaigns about their solvency since the beginning of the summer, and Société Générale has lost 22.5% of its value.

BNP, Société Générale and Crédit Agricole together hold nearly $57 billion in Greek sovereign and private debt, versus $34 billion held by the largest German banks and $14 billion at British banks. French banks also held more than €140 billion in total Spanish debt and almost €400 billion in Italian debt as of December, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. If either of these latter two governments were to default, their banking systems could collapse and take the French system with them.

BNP, Société Générale and Credit Agricole all say that their finances are in order and the market worries are unfounded. But it's difficult for the BNP executive to hide his concern.

"Look at the French banks' debt holdings versus those of U.S. banks," he continues. "The total debt of the three big U.S. banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan and Citigroup) is $5.86 trillion, or 39% of GDP, while the debts of BNP, Crédit Agricole and Société Générale come to €4.7 trillion, or 250% of French GDP."

Analysts are suggesting that the government is set to start nationalizing France's banks. The banks have remained silent on the matter, and the government denies this talk. But the last time the French state intervened in the banking system in a big way, the results were disastrous. As recently as the 1980s, most French banks were owned by the state, and by the 1990s the sector was bordering on bankruptcy. The French banking sector shrank by nearly 50% during the decade, while the those in other countries such as Britain and the U.S. grew by 39% and 50%, respectively.

The most famous case of that time was Crédit Lyonnais, which was plagued by mismanagement throughout the 1980s and 1990s until it shifted its debts and liabilities into a new state-owned company, the Consortium de Réalisation. In 2003 Crédit Lyonnais was taken over by Crédit Agricole, but in July 2008 its bills came due anyway.

An arbitration court ordered the Consortium de Réalisation to pay €240 million to the liquidators of the Bernard Tapie group, along with €105 million in interest and €45 million in moral damages—a total of €395 million for one erstwhile borrower. Meanwhile, the SdBO (Western Bank Corporation), a subsidiary of Crédit Lyonnais, lent sums to the Tapie family that added up to more than two-and-a-half times the bank's total capital. French taxpayers paid out more than €15 billion for the mismanagement of Crédit Lyonnais over the years.

The taxpayer-backed losses of mortgage lender Crédit Foncier came to €2 billion. And the Hervet bank (now part of the HSBC group) announced the first losses in its history after its 1982 nationalization.

These and other disasters were brought on by the bank nationalizations of the early 1980s. But despite the subsequent privatizations, French bank boards are still dominated by the alumni of France's famous ENA, the Ecole Nationale d'Administration, and by officials who have worked at the Ministry of Finance. A study by the Management Institute at the Université de La Rochelle finds that between 1995 and 2004 banks administered by government-linked technocrats were in greater total debt than those that were not.

Whether the market's worst fears are realized or not, French banks certainly maintain an all-too-close relationship to the state. This opaque system doesn't offer outsiders much visibility, save for the knowledge that indebted banks and an indebted French state intend to continue to cover each other, no matter the cost and on taxpayers' backs if they must. If U.S. money-market managers no longer trust the French system, this is a glaring reason why. The fastest way to regain their trust would be to end this system.

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Moody's Downgrades Top French Banks On Fears Of Greek Crisis

Moody's downgraded the credit ratings of French banks Societe Generale and Credit Agricole on Wednesday following a period of huge volatility in the markets as investors fretted about their exposure to Greece's debts.

Some sort of move by Moody's had been widely expected this week since the agency had put them and rival BNP Paribas on review for downgrade in mid-June.

While cutting its rating on Societe Generale's long-term debt rating by one notch to Aa3 and Credit Agricole's by the same amount to Aa1, Moody's warned that both could have their ratings downgraded by a further notch as it assesses "the implications of the persistent fragility in the bank financing markets." BNP's rating also remains under review.

The downgrades come as Europe scrambles to deal with the Greek debt crisis amid mounting fears that the debt-laden nation may have to default. That would leave some banks holding a lot of debt that might never be repaid, and investors are wondering if the banks have enough of a cushion to absorb those losses.

Because of those fears, some European banks have been having trouble securing the loans they need to fund their day-to-day operations; U.S. money-market funds have seemingly been particularly reluctant, and one European bank was forced to pay higher than market rates recently to get dollar funding from the European Central Bank.

Moody's assessment on Wednesday explored how the banks would weather a significant loss on their Greek debt, and the new review will now look at how much they've been affected by the difficulty to raise money on capital markets.

"Our concern now is more the financing markets of banks. Funding conditions have become more difficult and the risk is that persists and that becomes progressively more negative the longer it persists," said Nicholas Hill, an analyst at Moody's.

The banks, Societe Generale and BNP Paribas, in particular, have denied that the funding difficulties have put them in any real danger, saying that they still have plenty of access to loans.

Moody's maintained its Aa2 rating on BNP Paribas because its profits and capital base "provide an adequate cushion to support its Greek, Portuguese and Irish exposure."

Following the downgrade, Societe Generale said Moody's analysis shows that the bank's exposure to Greece "to be modest and manageable."

Earlier this week, Societe Generale's chief executive Frederic Oudea said that the bank was prepared for a downgrade and that it would not change its outlook.

Christian Noyer, the governor of the Banque de France, also shrugged off the news.

"For me, it's relatively good news," Noyer told French radio RTL. "First, because it's a very limited downgrade, only on two out of three banks, and especially since Moody's rates them better than the other two agencies (Standard & Poor's and Fitch), so, in reality, it put them at the same level or even slightly higher than the other agencies."

Government spokeswoman Valerie Pecresse, who is also the budget minister, reiterated her "confidence in the position of the French banks."

But analyst Louise Cooper of BGC Partners said that there are real concerns about the banks' access to funding.

"Why are share prices then so low and volatile? Because investors are highly skeptical of what they are told. Why are they so skeptical? Because clearly anyone who works in these markets ... will tell you that lending between banks and other financial groups in the short term wholesale markets is anything but normal," she said.

Credit Agricole did not comment on the downgrade specifically but said in a statement that its retail bank will put in place a general guarantee of the investment banking subsidiary. The retail bank, Credit Agricole SA, is generally considered to be in a stronger position than the investment banking arm.

The statement seemed aimed at reassuring investors of the level of support available to the investment bank.

It may have worked: Credit Agricole was the only one of the three banks whose shares were trading higher on Wednesday afternoon. They were up 3.2 percent.

Societe Generale was down 2.8 percent, while BNP Paribas was also pressured even though it wasn't downgraded. Its share price fell 2.2 percent.

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Sylvie Corbet contributed to this report.